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Regime: A Quantitative Analysis
Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen *
INTRODUCTION
Initially, bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") were intended as legal
instruments to promote and protect investments from rich capital exporting
states to the developing world. While BITs signed between developing
countries (hereinafter South-South BITs) began to emerge from the mid-
1960s onwards with the 1964 Kuwait-Iraq BIT, a typical BIT was until
recently negotiated between a developed and a developing country
(hereinafter North-South BITs). Accompanied by rising outward foreign
direct investment ("FDI") stocks from developing countries over the last
decade, however, this pattern has begun to change as many developing
countries have increasingly entered into BITs among themselves.' South-
South BITs today account for around 40% of the global network of BITs,
and more than 100 develoqing countries have entered into BITs with
another developing country. Most have been signed within the same
region, and many recent South-South BITs have been facilitated at
minilateral conferences organized by the United Nations Conference on
* Ph.D. candidate, London School of Economics. Contact: 1.n.poulsen@lse.ac.uk. An earlier
version of the paper was presented at the conference "The Politics ofInternational Economic
Law: The Next Four Years," Washington D.C., November 2008, organized by the American
Society for International Law's International Economic Law Interest Group and at the "50th
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association: Exploring the Past, Anticipating
the Future," New York, January 2009, organized by the International Studies Association. I
would like to thank Mark Busch and the editors for helpful comments and suggestions.
' See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD], SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS at 5, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/3,
U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.D.26 (2005).
2 Id. Note that in contrast to UNCTAD's statistics, I do not distinguish between transition
countries and developing countries.
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Trade and Development (UNCTAD) or individual capital exporting
countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, or France.
Given the initial purpose of BITs, this development in the international
investment regime is notable and raises a number of questions. For
instance, does the popularity of South-South BITs imply that after decades
of resistance, developing countries have finally converged completely to the
norms of the developed world with respect to foreign investment treatment
and protection standards? If true, that could give proponents of a
multilateral investment treaty a strong political argument: if developing
countries consistently incorporate the exact same clauses in South-South
BITs as they do in North-South BIT, there is no apparent reason they
should refuse to incorporate similar provisions in a multilateral framework.
Alternatively, South-South BITs might espouse a different vision of
international investment rules compared to their North-South counterparts.
If so, what-if any-implications would that have for the global investment
protection regime? Does it mean, for instance, that investment flows
between developing countries are increasingly covered by systematically
different BIT standards compared to investments made between developed
and developing countries?
In order to examine these questions, this paper will investigate whether
there are systematic differences in investment-rule making between South-
South and North-South BITs. As noted by UNCTAD in its cursory review
of South-South BITs, such an analysis has to be comprehensive and
detailed enough to credibly identify whether or not South-South BITs in
fact incorporate specific features.4  Accordingly, this paper will utilize a
newly constructed database with 303 BITs signed by 101 countries from
1994 to 2006 analyzed according to a set of quantitative indicators of
investment provisions, which in turn allows large-sample statistical
analyses. Space constraints naturally preclude a comprehensive
examination of the similarities and differences between all substantial and
procedural BIT provisions. The focus is therefore on two clauses, which
have often been in dispute between developing countries and developed
countries in multilateral discussions on investment rules in the past, namely
(post-entry) national treatment provisions and provisions on repatriation of
investment-related funds.
The analysis finds that South-South BITs do in fact vary
systematically from North-South BITs with respect to these two provisions
as South-South BITs are typically less comprehensive in scope. It appears
that South-South BITs have been more likely to restrict, or exclude,
national treatment from their substantive provisions, as well as include
certain carve-outs to the transfer provisions to allow exceptional measures
Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The
Diffusion ofBilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 265, 271 (2008).
4 UNCTAD, supra note 1, at 47.
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taken under balance-of-payments difficulties for instance. The implications
for the international investment protection regime are unclear, however, as
South-South BITs have typically failed to ensure that their more narrow
scope is not potentially "levelled out" by the treaties' most-favoured-nation
("MFN") provisions. This is somewhat perplexing, and based on interview
feedback from BIT-negotiators, I conclude by speculating whether this de
facto coherence in developing countries' BIT-networks might be
unintended.
The paper is structured as follows. To provide the context of the
analysis, the first section will outline the politics of the international
investment regime in the post-colonial era. The second section will
introduce the two provisions under review. The third section will outline
the methodology applied in the analysis, as it departs substantially from the
traditional legal literature investigating BITs. The fourth section will
analyze whether there has been systematic variation in the content of South-
South BITs with respect to the two provisions after conditioning on
numerous covariates. The fifth section will review the extent to which the
differences may be "levelled out" by the treaties' MFN provisions and
further discuss the implications of the results. Lastly, a short conclusion
will follow.
I. THE DISPUTED INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME
First, some background. The reordering of global power relations after
the First World War meant that Western states faced greater difficulties in
the developing world when trying to enforce their views on the appropriate
treatment of foreign investors.5 In the absence of direct colonial rule, force
and Gunboat diplomacy gradually became unfeasible in many parts of the
world, and more benign means of enforcement had to be found.6  One
option was a legally binding multilateral agreement on investment. But
repeated attempts by Western states within the League of Nations
ultimately failed due to resistance from capital-importing states.' Similar
attempts were made after the Second World War, when the United States
proposed an International Trade Organization (ITO), which would enshrine
the Western conceptions of international minimum standards for foreign
investors.8 While this view appealed to capital-exporting states, that was
certainly not the case with a number of developing countries (primarily
See CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE
NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 8-12 (1985); ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS
PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT ch. 1
(2009).
6 M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 37-39 (2d ed.
2004).
7 NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 5, at 15-16.
8 CLAIR WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 145-48 (1949).
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Latin American countries and India), which in turn associated forced
compensation and international arbitration of investment disputes with
continued foreign domination and control over their resources.9 A resulting
compromise on this and other issues could not be reached and the less
ambitious General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was put in
charge of managing international trade in the post-war era.'o Completely
absent from the GATT, however, were issues pertaining to foreign
investment, and the post-colonial conflict between developed and
developing countries over which legal principles should determine the
treatment and protection of foreign investors therefore remained
unresolved.
As a response, capital-exporting states within the OECD initiated a
new round of negotiations for an international investment treaty in 1962
after a series of failed non-governmental attempts during the 1940s and
1950s." This proposal eventually failed as well as it became clear that
developing countries would never agree to its terms. Many post-colonial
states at the time had turned towards legal doctrines of sovereign control to
legitimize their increasingly nationalist economic policies. Particularly, the
so-called "Calvo Doctrine" became popular as it advocated against favoring
foreign companies with independent standards and instead argued that
multinationals only had a riqht to be treated as well-or as bad-as
companies of the host state. Apart from the substantive standards
governing the affairs of foreign investors, this principle entailed settling
investment disputes in local courts rather than through international
arbitration. As a group, developing countries pursued these ideas in the
General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) proposing a New
International Economic Order ("NIEO"),13 which allowed them "Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources." 4  A cornerstone result of these
efforts was the 1974 "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States,"
which stipulated that foreign investment disputes--over expropriation or
otherwise-should be settled in the courts of host states and according to
9 Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 16-17 (2007).
1o WILCOX, supra note 8, at 145-48; Riyaz Dattu, A Journey From Havana to Paris: The
Fifty-Year Quest for the Elusive Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 24 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 275, 286-88 (2000).
1 See The Proposed Convention to Protect Private Foreign Investment, 9 J. PUB. L. 115
(1960); A. A. Fatouros, An International Code to Protect Private Investment - Proposals
and Perspectives, 14 U. TORONTO L.J. 77, 89-90 (1961); see also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL,
supra note 5, at 20-21.
12 See Amos S. Hershey, The Calvo and Drago Doctrines, I AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (1907);
see also SORNARAJAH, supra note 6, at 38.
13 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974).
14 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, at 15,
U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A15217 (Dec. 14,1962).
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domestic law.'5  This of course contradicted Western aspirations of an
international minimum standard and demonstrated the North-South dispute
over the guiding principles of international investment law.' 6
But what capital-exporting states "lost" at the multilateral level, they
gradually obtained through bilateral negotiations. Parallel to its multilateral
efforts in the period after the Second World War, the United States thus
expanded and upgraded its existing network of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation ("FCN") treaties, which apart from commercial and navigation
matters dealt with the treatment of foreign investors." While the treaties
did not obtain as central a role for the treatment of foreign investment in
developing countries as intended by United States policymakers,' 8 they did
provide an important inspiration for European states similarly eager to
obtain favorable and legally binding standards for their investors abroad.
Having lost almost all its investments after its defeat in the Second World
War, West Germany thus entered into a BIT with Pakistan in 1959, which
intended "to create favourable conditions for investments b nationals and
companies of either state in the territory of the other State."' In contrast to
FCN treaties, the BIT with Pakistan dealt solely with investment and was
specifically customized to be negotiated between a developed and a
developing country.20 Soon, numerous other European countries followed
Germany by entering into largely similar treaties with developing countries
and, in particular, former colonies and protectorates.
BITs established an independent standard for the treatment and
protection of foreign investors by obliging the contracting parties to provide
compensation for expropriation, whether expropriatory measures were
direct takings of assets or indirect takings "tantamount to expropriation."
Typically, they further insured investors the repatriation of their profits and
other capital, and they included further standards independent from
domestic law, such as so-called "umbrella clauses" obliging the contracting
1s Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), at 50, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 12, 1974).
16 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 15 (2008); see also Jason Web Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to
Foreign Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1550 (2009).
" See Jeswald W. Salacuse, BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties
and Their Impact on Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 655
(1990); Herman Walker Jr., Treaties for the Encouragement of Foreign Investment: Present
United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956); see, e.g., Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-S. Korea, Nov. 28, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 2217.
18 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States,
21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 201, 207-08 (1988).
19 Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, F.R.G.-Pak., Preamble, Nov.
25, 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24.
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parties to observe their contractual obligations vis-A-vis foreign investors,
as well as clauses providing for "fair and equitable treatment," "full
protection and security," and damages from war or conflicts. Finally, many
included non-discrimination standards, such as national and MFN
treatment.
Gradually, BITs became popular legal instruments for the protection of
Western investments in the developing world. Nevertheless, when
developed countries pushed for including investment standards in GATT-
negotiations during the Tokyo-round (1973-1979), developing countries
refused yet again to agree to a binding set of multilateral investment rules.
Similarly, negotiations within the UN for a non-binding code of conduct for
transnational corporations (1977-1992) broke down because of differences
between developing and developed countries over which substantive
standards host states should follow in their treatment of transnational
corporations. 2 1 And while the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) did lead to two
agreements related to investment-the Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS)-none of them dealt with investment protection (e.g.,
against expropriation) and non-discrimination was only provided for
services investors.
But while multilateral negotiations on investment protection continued
to disappoint Western countries, their network of BITs expanded, and with
the end of the Cold War they became truly global in nature. Accompanied
by further FDI-friendly reforms in the domestic investment codes of
developing countries, 22 on average more than 100 BITs were signed each
year during this decade. This was also the time when BITs began, as a
general rule, to allow investors direct recourse to international arbitration to
settle disputes against their host states without first having to exhaust local
remedies.23 This was in contrast to the WTO dispute settlement system, for
instance, where only states can bring claims, as well as customary
international law, where the usual procedure is that local remedies have to
be exhausted. In 1995, developed countries therefore found the time ripe
yet again to propose an international treaty for the liberalization and
protection of investment. While negotiated by OECD-countries, the
ambitious Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was meant to be
open for signature by developing countries as well. Negotiations
21 Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, U.N. ESCOR,
Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 7, Annex II, U.N. Doc. E/1983/17/Rev.1 (1983); NEWCOMBE &
PARADELL, supra note 5, at 33.
22 Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and FDI flows: An Overview, in THE
EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES,
DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS I (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs
eds., 2009) (see Table 3).
23 See Jason Web Yackee, Conceptual Difficulties in the Empirical Study of Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 405, 405 (2008).
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deadlocked; however, as OECD members were unable to agree on many of
the complex issues involved. Although they did not directly take part in the
negotiations, many developing countries expressed their concerns with the
proposed treaty (strongly backed by numerous civil society groups). 24
When the MAI ultimately failed, capital-exporting countries intensified
efforts to include a more comprehensive investment dimension in the
WTO.2 5 Negotiations had hardly taken off in 2001, however, before it was
clear that history was in the process of repeating itself. While developing
countries had accepted legally binding standards on the treatment and
protection of foreign investors on a bilateral basis, several were not willing
to "multilaterize" a similar set of rules. It eventually became clear that the
final outcome would fall far below what capital-exporting states had
initially hoped for, and investments were eventually taken off the
negotiating table. 26
A constant theme in the development of the international legal regime
for foreign investment has therefore been the North-South divide.
Nationalist tendencies in the post-colonial era led developing countries to
pursue a distinct vision of international investment principles different from
that of Western countries. Even the spread of liberal economic reforms
over the last three decades accompanied by the growing popularity of BITs
did not make developing countries agree to a comprehensive multilateral
investment agreement. This is despite the fact that a multilateral framework
arguably would result in a more transparent and predictable investment
regime than the current patchwork of bilateral obligations.
It is, however, important to recall that in contrast to multilateral
negotiations, developing countries have for the most part been "regime
takers" in BIT-negotiations with more powerful capital-exporting state.
The rapid expansion of the global BIT-network may therefore not have
represented a complete consensus among developed and developing
countries on which standards should govern the affairs of foreign investors,
which could explain developing countries' different positions when they
have negotiated on a bilateral basis and when they have negotiated as a
group.
If so, the question becomes whether the recent rush towards South-
South BITs might reflect a greater degree of consensus among developed
24 Pierre Sauv6, Multilateral Rules on Investment: Is Forward Movement Possible?, 9 J.
INT'L EcON. L. 325, 326 (2006); DAVID HENDERSON, THE MAI AFFAIR: A STORY AND ITS
LESSONS (2000); Andrew Walter, NGOs, Business, and International Investment: The
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, Seattle, and Beyond, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 51, 51
(2001).
25 Sauv6, supra note 24, at 326.
26 Id. at 326-27.
27 Stefan D. Amarasinha & Juliane Kokott, Multilateral Investment Rules Revisited, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 119 (Peter Muchlinski,
Federico Ortino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008).
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and developing countries. For while the bargaining power of countries like
India and China on the one hand and small African countries on the other is
of course not equal, many BITs between developing countries have
nevertheless often been negotiated in a more symmetric bargaining context
than North-South BITs. An overview of the content of South-South BITs
may therefore provide useful insights into the preferences of developing
countries in the international investment regime. As mentioned above, if
they are completely similar to North-South BITs that could indicate that
there has indeed been a convergence of views between developing and
developed countries. On the other hand, if there are systematic differences
between North-South and South-South BITs, it not only raises the question
of whether a multilateral investment treaty is more feasible today than it
was a decade ago, but also the practical issue of whether investment flows
between developing countries are covered by different provisions compared
to North-South flows.
In an attempt to answer these questions, I will compare two BIT-
provisions across South-South and North-South BITs, both of which have
been in dispute between developing countries and developed countries in
multilateral discussions on investment rules in the past.
II. THE TWO PROVISIONS
The first of these is national treatment ("NT") for established
investors. The purpose of an NT clause in investment treaties is to oblige
host states not to discriminate, de jure or de facto, between foreign investors
and similarly situated national investors.28 In BITs, the clauses typically
stipulate that foreign investors and their investments shall be "accorded
treatment no less favourable than that which the host state accords to its
own investors,"29 and some, such as American BITs, specify that the clause
applies only in "like situations,"30 or "like circumstances."I Being a
relative or contingent standard, NT will of course be of little use if domestic
investors have limited rights. However, the purpose of NT provisions in
BITs differs fundamentally from the NT concept which was part of the
NEIO. Whereas the latter was intended to limit the rights foreign investors
could rely upon through international law, BITs do not preclude that
standards more favorable than those granted to national investors should be
applied to foreign investors (on the contrary, see above).3 2
Not surprisingly, developed countries have been strong proponents of
28 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 16; NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 5, ch. 4.
29 See, e.g., Danish 2008 model BIT, art. 3.1 (on file with author).
30 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 2.1 (1994).
31 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 3.1 (2004).
32 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 178; UNCTAD, NATIONAL TREATMENT at 37,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (Vol. IV), U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D. 16 (1999), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/psiteiitdl 1v4.en.pdf.
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including NT clauses in their BITs in order to "level the playing field"
among their investors abroad and domestic companies of host states.33
Developing countries, on the other hand, have traditionally sought to
exclude, or substantially limit, the standard in order to favor their own
nationals. 34 Often this agenda has been pursued based on infant-industry
protection arguments, which (in theory) provide developing countries an
economic justification for a certain level of discrimination against foreign
competition. In multilateral discussions, such arguments have been made
for decades. During the discussions on the UN Draft Code on
Transnational Corporations in the 1980s, for instance, developing countries
thus proposed to limit the NT standard by allowing measures specified in
legislation relating to developing countries' development objectives. 36
Similarly, although large-scale protectionist experiments have gone out of
fashion in most of the developing world, several developing countries were
cautious about granting foreign investors unlimited NT in the recent
discussions on investment issues in the Doha Round. Such granting, they
argued, would prevent subsidizing or providing other benefits to national
investments, thereby potentially undermining national development
strategies.3
Another BIT provision, where there has been a divergence of views
between developing and developed countries, is the free transfer of
investment-related funds out of the host state. While such clauses can and
do differ from treaty to treaty, most BITs stipulate that a wide range of
payments and other-investment related funds shall have a right to be
transferred out of the host state without delay and, typically, in a freely
convertible currency. 38 From foreign investors' point of view, these clauses
are key in investment-treaties, as the ability to freely repatriate funds can be
an important factor in their investment-decision process. Developing
countries, on the other hand, often have an interest in not restraining their
ability to adopt certain restrictive exchange rate or other measures, for
instance, as means to prevent or confront economic and financial crises.
3 It is typically only North American BITs that include legally binding pre-entry NT
provisions.
34 Salacuse, supra note 17, at 668.
3 See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND POLICY ch. 10 (8th ed. 2008).
36 U.N. CTR. ON TRANSNATIONAL CORP. [UNCTC], BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES at
33, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/65, U.N. Sales No. E.88.II.A.1 (1988), available at
http://unctc.unctad.org/aspx/allDocsYear.aspx; see The Secretariat, U.N. Comm'n on
Transnat'l Corp., Report of the Secretariat on the Outstanding Issues in the Draft Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations, paras. 55-61, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc E/C.10/1984/S/5 (May 29, 1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 602.
37 Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Report to the
General Council, para. 93, WT/WGTI/6 (Dec. 9, 2002) (WTO Report), available at
www.wto.org/english/docs e/docs e.htm.
38 DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 85-95.
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Particularly, the numerous investment claims brought against Argentina in
the wake of its 2001 financial crisis have sparked a debate on the risks of
not subjecting such guarantees to certain exceptions. 3 9  But while this
particular crisis might have brought attention to this issue, it has always
been controversial. Jeswald Salacuse thus stated in 1990: "[T]he
negotiation of BIT provisions on monetary transfer is often one of the most
difficult negotiations to conclude. Capital-exporting countries seek broad,
unrestricted guarantees on monetary transfers, while developing countries
press for limited guarantees, subject to a variety of exceptions." 40
As with the NT provision, this difference in preferences was also clear
in the discussions on the UN Draft Code on Transnational Corporations,
where rules on currency transfer was one of the key issues developed and
developing countries could not agree upon.4 1 Similarly, during the recent
investment negotiations in the Doha Round, many developing countries
argued that a host state should be able to prevent foreign investors from
freely transferring revenues and capital out of its country if it were under
economic difficulties.4 2 While such an exception is included in some
North-South BITs, it is far from the norm (see below).
For my purposes, the question is therefore whether South-South BITs
are any different from North-South BITs with respect to provisions on NT
and the transfer of funds. Have the skepticism of some developing
countries towards wide-ranging NT provisions in multilateral discussions
been reflected in BITs signed amongst themselves? Similarly, have South-
South BITs been more likely to include certain safeguards against
exceptional measures taken under balance-of-payments difficulties? As
will be argued in the next section, the strategy to investigate these questions
will benefit from the application of quantitative tools.
39 See Jos6 E. Alvarez & Kathryn Khamsi, The Argentine Crisis and Foreign Investors: A
Glimpse Into the Heart of the Investment Regime, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 2008-2009 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009); Abba Kolo & Thomas
Walde, Economic Crises, Capital Transfer Restrictions and Investor Protection Under
Modern Investment Treaties, 3 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 154, 154-55 (2008); Annamaria
Viterbo, Dispute Settlement over Exchange Measures Affecting Trade and Investments: The
Overlapping Jurisdictions of the IMF WTO, and the ICSID (Soc'y of Int'l Econ. Law,
Working Paper No. 34/08, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1154673.
40 Salacuse, supra note 17, at 669; see Kolo & WAlde, supra note 39.
41 INCTC, supra note 36, at 179.
42 This suggestion was strongly opposed by the U.S. delegation for instance. See
Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Report on the Meeting
Held on 16-18 September 2002, Note by the Secretariat, para. 121, WT/WGTI/M/19 (Dec.
3, 2002) (WTO Report), available at www.wto.org/english/docs e/docs-e.htm.
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III. METHODOLOGY
A. Is It Necessary To Code BITs? Is It Possible?
The literature investigating the content of BITs can generally be
divided into two categories. Whereas one set of studies compares and
contrasts several treaty obligations across a few treaties, another takes an
issue-based approach, which investigates one particular aspect of BITs with
ad hoc references to a large stock of treaties as illustrations. 45  Both
approaches have their obvious advantages and drawbacks. However,
neither of them can credibly identify and/or correlate variation in the
content of BITs across countries or time. This can only be done by
comparing a large and representative sample of BITs, which in turn is only
practically possible if based on a quantification of the treaties' content
based on a set of transparent underlying criteria.
Necessity is one thing; feasibility is another. While the exercise of
quantifying legal documents is not new within the social sciences,46 many
would undoubtedly consider it pointless to even try and capture the content
of complex legal documents, such as BITs, with numeric values. A
comprehensive evaluation of a treaty's terms and conditions is bound to be
a qualitative exercise, which has to carefully consider the ordinary meaning
of its terms in their context and in light of their object and purpose. 47 An
in-depth analysis of a given BIT is therefore not well-suited for quantitative
analysts trying to observe the world through binary codes of l's and 0's.
But while this skepticism is perhaps well-founded, most would probably
nevertheless agree that it is possible to code certain aspects of BITs in a
meaningful and informative manner. For instance, irrespective of
discipline, most scholars group BITs into two distinct groups: one which
grants investors a right of admission (typically North American BITs), and
one that does not (typically European BITs). This is of course a simplified
distinction as admission clauses can, and do, vary substantially. But
43 Paul Alexander Haslam, A 'Flexibility for Development' Index: Can International
Investment Agreements be Compared Quantitatively?, 19 EUR. J. DEv. REs. 251, 252-53
(2007).
4 Id.; see, e.g., Mark Kantor, The New Draft Model U.S. BIT: Noteworthy Developments,
21 J. INT'L ARB. 383 (2004).
45 Haslam, supra note 43, at 253; ORG.FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv. [OECD],
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND TRACKING INNOVATIONS
ch. 1 (2008).
46 For example, publications based on the Comparative Constitutions Project are
available at http://www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/publications.htm, and
contributions on the interaction between investor protection and financial development can
be found in publications such as Rafael La Porta et at., Legal Determinants of External
Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997), and Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.
ECON. 1113 (1998).
47 Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, openedfor signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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however imperfect, it is nevertheless generally accepted as a legitimate
"binary coding" of BITs that can identify general features of different
48treaties. This paper simply takes a step further by grouping BITs
according to an additional set of criteria useful to investigate my empirical
question, namely whether systematic variation in BITs is co-determined by
both parties being developing countries. Note, however, that what the
paper does not intend to do is to try to compare the BITs according to an
aggregate quantitative score based on some underlying concept such as the
treaties' strength or flexibility for development. This has been tried
elsewhere.4 9 But while not necessarily an illegitimate exercise, it involves
major and ultimately subjective assumptions on the role and importance of
different provisions which would be more than problematic for most
purposes, including this paper.
B. Sample
The sample used comprises 303 BITs signed by 100 countries from
1994 to 2006 available in English or French from UNCTAD's online BIT-
database.so Out of these, 191 have been signed between 1994 and 1999,
and the rest have been signed between 2000 and 2006 (many recent BITs
have not yet been made available on UNCTAD's database). While the
sampling process was random, it nevertheless resulted in a slight
oversampling of countries with large BIT programs. This was addressed by
a re-sampling to allow the majority of countries included in the dataset to
have a sampling rate of between 20% and 30%. The language criteria
meant a substantial undersampling of Italian treaties, but I am nevertheless
rather confident that the sample is sufficiently representative of the total
population of BITs.51
Distinguishing between developing and developed countries is always
tricky, particularly in studies over time. For my purposes, I define a
developed country as one, which the World Bank has classified as a "high-
income" country for the majority of the period in focus. Apart from
48 See, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 81.
49 See Brian Hicks, Dissecting the Black-Box: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Global
Investments (Mar. 27, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 2008 Annual
Meeting of the International Studies Association), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p250 7 08 index.html; Haslam, supra note 43.
'0 UNCTAD's online BIT-database can be found at
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch 779.aspx.
51 See generally UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2007: TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS, EXTRACTIVE INDusTRIES AND DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2007, U.N. Sales No. E.07.I1.D.9 (2007), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2007overview en.pdf (describing the spatial and temporal
distribution of BITs); UNCTAD, Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2 (2000), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf
(same).
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Western countries, this includes countries such as South Korea and Kuwait.
While these countries have signed numerous treaties with Western
countries, their role in South-South BIT negotiations is arguably often that
of capital exporters; and I thus expect their interests to be similar to
Western capital exporters seeking as favorable terms for their investors
abroad as possible.5 2 Among the sampled treaties, a North-South BIT
therefore has one of the following countries as its home state: the 15 "old"
members of the European Union, members of the European Free Trade
Association, Australia, New Zealand, United States, Canada, Japan, Korea,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Israel, Kuwait, or United Arab Emirates. This
classification leaves 124 South-South BITs, which corresponds to 41% of
the total sample.
Rather than using a computer package, the coding was done by me as
some of the detailed questions involved appear impossible or, at a
minimum, risky to attempt to code using automated techniques. As BITs
often include different obligations for the contracting parties, all indicators
are coded based on the obligations of host states vis-d-vis home state
investors. North-South BITs always have the developed country as the
"home state," whereas the "home state" in South-South BITs is distributed
randomly across the sample between large and small developing countries.
C. Covariates
Since I am interested in whether changing the BIT partner from a
developed to a developing country, ceteris paribus, have changed the
content of BITs, my explanatory variable of interest is a dummy variable
indicating whether the BIT-dyad is between two developing countries. Of
course, there are other reasons a host state might, or might not, wish to vest
foreign investors with certain rights in its BITs, apart from whether the
home state is a developing or developed country. I thus control for the level
of development of the host state by including the natural log of its GDP per
capita income as well as its level of incoming investment by including the
natural log of its inward FDI stock. I moreover control for its political
environment by including a dummy variable for whether it has a socialist
legal tradition (typically former or current communist countries) and two
variables indicating whether it had a left-wing and/or a nationalist
government in the year it signed the BIT.53  Furthermore, I include a
dummy variable for whether the host state is from Latin America (the
"home region" of the Calvo Doctrine) and similarly include dummy
variables to capture systematic tendencies in the BIT-networks of the ten
52 See Salacuse, supra note 17, at 658-59.
5 In sensitivity analysis, various indexes attempting to measure the investment climate of
the host state were included as well. This reduced the observations by almost one third, and
because the indexes were generally not significant in any of the estimations, they are
excluded from the analysis below.
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countries with the largest number of BITs signed at the end of the period.5 4
As a measure of the economic integration between the BIT partners, I
include a variable measuring their bilateral trade flows as a share of the host
state's GDP. Finally, I include a dummy variable for whether the BIT was
signed after 2000 to capture possible time-effects. A summary of the
covariates (excluding the country and period dunmmies) and their bivariate
correlations are given in Tables 1 and 2 below.
TABLE 1
Leftwing 303 0.25 0.44 0 1 4
executive
Socialist legal 303 0.32 0.47
tradition
0 1 5
Sources: (1) World Bank, World Development Indicators; (2) International Monetary
Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics; (3) UNCTAD, FDI statistics; (4) Thorsten Beck et al.,
New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database ofPolitical Institutions, 15
WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 165 (2001); and (5) Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic
Consequences ofLegal Origins, 46 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 285 (2008).
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1: II: III: IV: V: VI: VII: VIII:
1: South-South BIT I
II: Bilateral trade (% of host GDP) -0.11 1
III: Ln GDP per capita -0.05 -0.04 1
IV: Ln inward FDI stock 0.18 -0.10 0.26 1
V: Leftwing executive -0.15 -0.04 0.28 -0.00 1
VI: Nationalist executive -0.07 0.01 0.12 -0.14 0.23 1
VIl: Socialist legal tradition -0.07 0.02 -0.10 -0.40 0.04 0.09 1
Vill: Latin American country -0.20 0.05 0.36 0.18 0.28 -0.13 -0.29 1
D. Estimation Techniques
As both provisions are coded as binary variables (see below), the
estimations use logistic regression techniques. But since the content of a
specific BIT is not likely to be independent from the content of other BITs
signed by the same host or home state, the assumption of unit independence
necessary for normal logit models is not upheld in this case. Many
countries have model BITs, for instance, which they use as their reference
point during negotiations.55 While the country-specific dummies control for
some of this variation, this is not sufficient, and in two separate sets of
regressions, I therefore adjust standard errors for correlations between
individual home or host countries' BITs, respectively.
Initial data-analysis revealed an additional challenge, however, often
found in applied logistic regression analyses, namely that of "separation."
This is when one or more variables predict the outcome perfectly (complete
separation) or almost perfectly (quasi-separation), which is problematic as it
can make the maximum likelihood estimation impossible to calculate (i.e.,
regression coefficients become positive or negative infinity). Not
surprisingly, these variables are the country-specific dummies capturing
idiosyncratic effects of specific BIT-programs (the problem is thus a
variation of the intra-country correlation issue described above). With
respect to NT provisions, there is thus complete separation, as all Dutch and
U.K. BITs in the sample, for instance, include NT clauses without major
limitations (see definition below). With respect to transfer clauses there is
quasi-separation. For instance, only two recent Chinese BITs in the sample
do not include limitations in their transfer clauses and only one U.K. BIT
does (see again definition below). Unfortunately, however, most
econometric textbooks fail to provide a remedy for the separation problem.
5 On the several purposes of model BITs, see Salacuse, supra note 17, at 662-63.
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In my initial logit estimations I follow the advice of Davidson and
MacKinnon 56 and leave out the "perfect classifiers," when there is complete
separation. But since this solution risks underspecifying the model, I run a
second set of regressions using maximum penalized likelihood estimation,
in which the likelihood function is penalized in order to produce consistent
parameter estimates in the presence of separation." This estimation
technique does not allow us to adjust the standard errors, however, and I am
therefore left with three regressions on each dependent variable confronting
different, but ultimately related, estimation challenges.58  If the different
specifications all lead to the same conclusions, this would naturally increase
our trust in the robustness of the results (and vice-versa).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. National Treatment
The first question I address is whether developing countries' skeptic
statements in multilateral discussions towards wide-ranging NT provisions
have been reflected in BITs signed amongst themselves. I therefore
compare the share of BITs which exclude or limit NT provisions across the
two BIT-dyads. Limitations are here understood as clauses, where the NT
standard is either not legally binding or subject to domestic laws (and thus
substantially restricted). It suffices to say that this simple distinction will
result in grouping BITs, where NT provisions would potentially be applied
somewhat differently on a case-to-case basis. However, certain
simplifications are necessary to identify general, but hopefully still
meaningful, patterns across a large number of treaties. For my purposes,
certain sector specific reservations therefore do not count as major
limitations.59 Moreover, I do not distinguish between BITs specifying that
NT shall be provided in the "same" or "identical" circumstances60 from
BITs where this basis of comparison is not included. Neither do I
56 RUSSELL DAVIDSON & JAMES G. MACKINNON, ESTIMATION AND INFERENCE IN
ECONOMETRICS 521 (1993).
57 See generally Christopher Zorn, A Solution to Separation in Binary Response Models,
13 POL. ANALYSIS 157 (2005); David Firth, Bias Reduction in Maximum Likelihood
Estimates, 80 BIOMETRIKA 27 (1993); see also Georg Heinze & Michael Schemper, A
Solution to the Problem ofSeparation in Logistic Regression, 21 STAT. MED. 2409 (2002).
58 An alternative specification strategy would have been hierarchical modeling. This is
not suitable here, however, as country-specific effects clearly cannot be regarded as a
random variable, as required in the random effect model; and a logistic regression model
with fixed-effects is equally problematic due to the separation problem.
5 While a formal distinction can be made between "reservations" and "exceptions," I use
these terms interchangeably along with the term limitations. See generally NEWCOMBE &
PARADELL, supra note 5, ch. 10.
6o See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Belize-U.K.,
art.3, Apr. 30, 1982, 1294 U.N.T.S. 199.
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distinguish between BITs using the term "no less favourable" treatment and
those using terms such as "same treatment" or "as favourable" treatment.
Finally, for my purposes, the general taxation exception to NT found in
most BITs is not considered to substantially restrict the NT provisions nor
are the exceptions to NT based on prudential measures in financial







I: No NT 0.20 0.08 0.36
(0. 15 - 0.24) (0.04 - 0.12) (0.28 - 0.45)
III: Specific exceptions 0.11 0.16 0.03
(0.07 - 0.14) (0.1 - 0.21) (0.00O - 0.06)
V: No NT or major limitations to NT 0.26 0.12 0.46
(I or II) (0.21 - 0.31) (0.07 - 0.17) (0.37 - 0.55)
IN: 303 179 124
Notes: 95 % confidence intervals in brackets. Percentages don't add up due to rounding.
A breakdown of the sample is provided in Table 3. Purely aspirational
NT clauses are few and distributed more or less equally across the two BIT-
dyads. A greater share of North-South BITs has NT clauses with specific
exceptions, but this is almost solely driven by U.S. and Canadian treaties
which include exceptions to their NT provisions for the pre- and post-
establishment phases. The major difference, however, is that more than
one-third of South-South BITs does not include an NT provision at all
compared to only 8% of North-South BITs. This means that only 12% of
North-South BITs exclude or limit their NT provisions as defined above,
whereas the share is 46% for South-South BITs. The confidence intervals
for the two groups do not overlap, and the difference is therefore unlikely to
61 See, e.g., Agreement for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Barb.-Can., art. 11, May 29, 1996, 2026 U.N.T.S. 341.
62 See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
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be due to random variation. It thus seems that South-South BITs have
indeed been less likely to incorporate wide-ranging NT clauses compared to
North-South BITs. The question is, however, whether this pattern is
actually due to the differences in BIT-partners, or instead reflects some
other underlying factors. In other words, is the systematic difference
between North-South and South-South BITs "real" or simply due to an
omitted variable bias?
Table 4 below provides the results from the logistic regressions.
Several country-dummies have been excluded from the "normal" maximum
likelihood estimations due to all of their treaties including NT provisions
without major limitations. China has been excluded as none of its BITs in
the sample include NT provisions without major limitations. With respect
to the three political variables, none of them are significant or substantial,
which could perhaps reflect the fact that BIT-negotiations rarely have been
particularly politicized affairs (see below). Across all three specifications
the Latin American dummy implies that Latin American countries signing
BITs have been less likely to exclude or limit NT clauses than developing
countries from other regions. This does not correspond with our intuitive
understanding of Latin America as less welcoming to foreign investors than
other regions. The bilateral trade variable indicates that countries with
closer economic ties have been less likely to exclude or limit NT provisions
(this relationship is significant in two out of three estimations), and the time
dummy shows that comprehensive NT provisions have been more common
in recent BITs compared to BITs from the 1990s. Finally, developing
countries with higher inward FDI stocks have tended to include less wide-
ranging NT provisions.
Most importantly for our purposes, the difference between South-
South and North-South BITs is substantial in all estimations, and significant
in two out of three. After conditioning on the included co-variates, South-
South BITs are still between two and three times more likely to limit or
exclude NT provisions. Accordingly, I am quite confident that developing
countries have been more likely to exclude or limit NT in their BITs when
the other contracting party has been a developing country. As we shall see
below, this is not the only systematic difference between South-South and
North-South BITs.
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Notes: Dependent variable is coded as 1 if NT clause is absent, non-legally binding or subject to
domestic laws. (I) Standard errors adjusted for correlation among home country BITs; (II)
standard errors adjusted for correlation among host country BITs. Constants included but not
reported. Chi2 values after Wald tests in brackets for (I) and (II), chi2 value after likelihood
ratio test in brackets for (III).
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B. Transfer Clauses
I continue the analysis by comparing BITs on the second indicator,
namely whether they include certain safeguards aainst exceptional
measures taken under balance-of-payments difficulties. Such safeguards
come in several forms. One option is to subject the transfer clause to
domestic laws, in which case the host state is free to limit the flow of
capital out of its economy, for instance during economic crises, as long as it
is done through law. 4 Another option is to allow exceptions to the free
transfer of funds, but only during balance-of-payments difficulties and
typically with a requirement that such restrictions should be necessary, non-
discriminatory and on a temporary basis.65 Finally, some treaties include
other major limitations that permit restrictions on capital flight, such as
certain Chilean BITs attempting to restrict short-term capital in- and
outflows.66  For my purposes, provisions safeguarding the powers of
financial services regulators 67 or national laws concerning bankruptcy,
trading or dealing in securities, criminal or administrative violations, or
compliance with resolution of tribunals 68 are not considered to specifically
safeguard measures taken during economic crises. Similarly, I do not find
the so-called "lumpy transfers" exception, to be as restrictive as those
mentioned above, and BITs including these are therefore grouped with BITs
without direct safeguards.69
63 See Kolo & Willde, supra note 39 (discussing whether international law makes it
illegal for a contracting party to a BIT to restrict such transfers during balance of payments
crises without such exceptions).
6 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Mutual Protection of Investments, Port. -
Bulg., art. 5, May 27, 1993, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/portugal bulgaria eng.pdf.
65 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, U.K.-Arg., art.
6, Dec. 11, 1990, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk-argentina.pdf.
66 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Chile-Austria, protocol, Sept. 8, 1999, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/austria-chile.pdf.
67 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Peru, art.
14, Nov. 14, 2006, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/canadaperu.pdf
68 See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Mozam., art. 5, Dec. 1, 1998, S. TREATY Doc. No. 106-31 (2000),
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iialdocs/bits/us_mozambique.pdf.
69 See Kolo & WIlde, supra note 39, at 163 (the lumpy transfer exception permits "the
parties to limit transfers of proceeds of liquidation to a certain percentage of an investment's
value per year, so long as the investor is permitted to maintain the value of the investment
domestically"). It is typically American BITs that include such exceptions. See, e.g., Treaty
Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, U.S.-Egypt, art. 5,
Mar. I1, 1986, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-24 (1986), available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43559.pdf.
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TABLE 5




I: Transfers subject to domestic laws and/or 0.22 0.10 0.40
other major restrictions (0.17 - 0.27) (0.05 - 0.14) (0.31 - 0.48)
III: No balance-of-payments or other major 0.73 0.85 0.56
restrictions to transfer clause (0.68 - 0.78) (0.80 - 0.90) (0.47 - 0.65)
N: 303 179 124
JNotes: 95 % confidence intervals in brackets. Percentages don't add up due to rounding.
Table 5 provides a breakdown of the sample according to these
criteria. Whereas the share of BITs which includes balance-of-payments
exceptions is low and almost the same in North-South and South-South
BITs, a much higher share of South-South BITs includes major restrictions
to the transfer clause and/or subject it to domestic laws. Forty percent of
South-South BITs in the sample thus incorporate such restrictions compared
to only ten percent of North-South BITs; and as with NT-provisions, the
confidence intervals show that this difference is not only substantial in
absolute terms, but also statistically significant.
In Table 6, the regressions again indicate that domestic political factors
in developing countries appear to have had little impact on the content of
their BITs. Moreover, as was also the case for NT-provisions, recent BITs
have had fewer exceptions to their transfer provisions, and developing
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TABLE 6
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Notes: Dependent variable is coded as I if transfer clause includes balance-of-payments
restrictions or other major restrictions such as subjecting the clause to domestic laws. (I)
Standard errors adjusted for correlation among home country BITs; (II) standard errors adjusted
for correlation among host country BITs. Constants included but not reported. Chi2 values after
Wald tests in brackets for (I) and (II), chi2 value after likelihood ratio test in brackets for (III).
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With respect to our variable of interest, South-South BITs have been
between three and four times more likely to include restrictions to their
transfer clauses. These estimates are significant across all estimations. As
with the NT provisions, I therefore still find substantial and significant
variation between South-South and North-South BITs in this regard even
after conditioning on several important covariates.
However, my focus only on transfer clauses may not be entirely
justified here, as developed countries might have included safeguards
against restrictions imposed during balance-of-payments crises elsewhere in
their BITs. Arguably, including safeguards during balance-of-payments
crises in BITs can be accomplished by including a general exception based
on national security concerns. In WTO jurisprudence at least, the exception
based on "essential security interests" in Article XXI(b) of GATT has been
constructed to include exchange control measures to protect economic
70 71interests.70 In BITs, such exceptions can cover the whole treaty or only
parts of it, such as the NT and MFN provisions, 72 general non-
discrimination provisions,3  full protection and security provisions,74 or
performance requirements. While all these provisions can be relevant
when establishing whether measures taken to prevent or confront an
economic crisis constitute a breach of a BIT as a whole,76 a narrower
70 See Kolo & Walde, supra note 39, at 160. Note that rulings on the applicability of
BITs' emergency clause with respect to financial crises have been contradictory. Compare
two claims against Argentina: CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) Case No. ARB/01/8, Award, paras. 359-378 (May 12, 2005), reprinted in 44
I.L.M. 1205 (2005); with LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, paras. 229-261 (Oct. 3, 2006), reprinted in 46
I.L.M. 40 (2007). Both disputes were based on Article XI in the Argentina-United States
BIT. See Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-2 (1993). For further discussion,
see August Reinisch, Necessity in International Investment Arbitration: An Unnecessary
Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v.
Argentina, 81 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 191 (2007).
71 See, e.g., Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-India, art.
15, Feb. 26, 1999, 2116 U.N.T.S.145.
72 See, e.g., Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Alb.-
Spain, art. 4, June 5, 2003, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/spain-albania.pdf.
7 See, e.g., Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Belgo-Luxemburg Economic Union-Guat., art. 3, Apr. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/BLEU-Guatemala-eng.pdf.
74 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and the Protection of Investments, Turk.-
Morocco, art. 2, Apr. 8, 1997, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/turkeymorocco.pdf.
7 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Croat.-Kuwait, art. 3, Mar. 8, 1997, available at
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/croatia-kuwait.pdf.
76 See Kolo & W5lde, supra note 39.
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question is whether the security exception covers the transfer provision in
particular. In practice, this is typically the case when the security exception
covers the whole treaty. Below, I repeat the previous analysis, this time
grouping BITs with direct restrictions in their transfer clauses with BITs,
where restrictions on investment transfers based on national security
interests could be allowed.
Table 7 below shows that North-South BITs are in fact more likely to
include security exceptions, but the share of BITs with a security exception
that covers the transfer provision is more or less similar between North-
South BITs and South-South BITs (and the difference is not statistically
significant). But the overall conclusion remains the same, for while around
half of the sample's South-South BITs incorporate a security exception that
covers the transfer provision and/or include restrictions to the transfer






I: No security exceptions 0.79 0.74 0.86
(0.75 - 0.84) (0.67 - 0 80) (0.80 - 0.92)
111: Security excepuion covers transfer provision 0.11 0.12 0.11
(typically when it covers the whole treaty) (0. 07 - 0. 14) (0.07 - 0.17) (0.05 - 0.16)
N: 303 179 124
Notes: 95 % confidence intervals in brackets. Percentages don't add up due to rounding.
* Include balance-of-payments restrictions as well as other major restrictions such as subjecting
the clause to domestic laws.
It is therefore not surprising that while the estimates did become lower
in the logistic regressions after also considering security exceptions, the
differences between North-South and South-South BITs are still substantial
across all three specifications and significant in two out of three (Table 8
below). I am therefore rather confident that South-South BITs have been
more likely to allow restrictions to the transfer clauses, for instance as a
means of insulating the contracting parties from capital flight in times of
economic crises.
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TABLE 8
Limitations on transfer clauses (incl. security exception)
Logistic regressions
Maximum likelihood Maximum penalized likelihood
(1)/(II) (Ill)
Odds ratio Odds ratio
South-South BIT 1.82/** 1.77*
(2.83/4.30) (3.03)
N 290 290
Notes: Dependent variable is coded as 1 if transfer clause includes balance-of-payments
restrictions or other major restrictions such as subjecting the clause to domestic laws. It is also
coded as 1 if the BIT includes a security exception covering the transfer provision. (I) Standard
errors adjusted for correlation among home country BITs. (1) Standard errors adjusted for
correlation among home country BITs; (II) standard errors adjusted for correlation among host
country BITs. Constants and coefficents on other included regressors not reported. Chi2 values
after Wald tests in brackets for (1) and (II), chi2 value after likelihood ratio test in brackets for
('LI).
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
V. IMPLICATIONS
After controlling for multiple potential covariates, the results show that
South-South BITs have been more likely to include restrictions to their NT
and transfer clauses.77 Thus, with respect to these two provisions at least, it
is not entirely correct when textbooks on international investment treaties
state that a review of BITs signed among developing countries "does not
reveal significant differences with agreements concluded with developed
states,"78 or that "treaties concluded between developing countries have in
substance remained very similar to those concluded by capital-exporting
countries." 79  Rather, a systematic (as opposed to ad hoc) review of the
treaties does in fact reveal that in South-South agreements, developing
countries have been more likely to agree to a different set of rules, which
potentially allows them more flexibility to pursue developmental concerns
than North-South BITs.
Where does this leave us? On the one hand, the conclusion may imply
n Moreover, in a separate set of regressions not reported here I controlled for whether
these results still hold after taking into account the extent to which the BITs incorporate a
legally binding consent to international investor-state arbitration. This did not change the
results or conclusions.
78 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 21.
79 DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 9-10.
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that while many past differences between developed and developing
countries with respect to foreign investment protection have been
overcome, one should perhaps not overstate the degree of consensus purely
based on the fact that South-South BITs are proliferating. If so, then the
popularity of South-South BITs cannot, in and of itself, be used as an
argument that a multilateral treaty on investment is more feasible today than
it was ten years ago.
Alternatively, the systematic differences should perhaps not be taken
as an indicator of developing countries' collective interests in the
international investment regime. Instead, it could simply be that demands
in BIT-negotiations between developing countries have been more easily
accommodated, not because they are necessarily thought to be prudent by
both contracting parties, but simply because negotiators may not consider
the BIT particularly relevant in practice. For instance, a senior developing
country official involved in negotiating BITs mentioned in an interview that
"things were much more flexible when negotiating with developing
countries."80 Another official recalled: "Our negotiations with developing
countries were generally much quicker and much easier. When demands
were made we didn't object, as most understood that these treaties were
basically just signals, rather than hard and serious legal agreements."81 By
contrast, it would probably be rare for developed countries to accept major
limitations to their model BITs and may therefore simply have walked away
from negotiations if such demands were made. A third BIT-negotiator
further explained: "We never actually had a position in our BIT-
negotiations, whether with developed or developing countries. So we just
signed off when drafts were presented to us, and that's why we have
different obligations in different treaties."82 Accordingly, further research
could examine whether the specific characteristics of South-South BITs are
in fact intended by developing countries to espouse a different vision of
international investment rules or merely because developing country
negotiators have not felt the need to insist on a particular set of provisions.
The statements by negotiators above suggest the latter.
But apart from the symbolic and political implications, does the
systematic difference among BITs imply that investors seeking protections
under BITs should expect a different set of provisions when covered under
South-South BITs compared to being covered by North-South BITs? Are
investors more likely to be met with restrictions to NT and repatriation of
80 Telephone interview with developing country BIT-negotiator (January 2009) (not for
attribution, on file with author). Note that all interviews referred to here are not-for-
attribution, as this was a condition of several interviewees to be quoted.
81 Telephone interview with developing country BIT-negotiator (April 2009) (not for
attribution, on file with author).
82 Telephone interview with developing country BIT-negotiator (July 2009) (not for
attribution, on file with author).
126
The Significance ofSouth-South BITS
30:101 (2010)
investment-related funds when covered by South-South BITs? The
statistical review above seems to imply this to be the case. In practical
terms, however, the content of BIT-provisions cannot be investigated in
isolation.
The analysis has thus far been based on the treaty texts alone and has
not taken into account MFN provisions. As a general rule, MFN provisions
operate in BITs according to all matters falling within the scope of the
treaty. Whether the ejusdem generis principle implies that the clause only
covers substantive provisions is unclear from existing case law. 84 Nor is it
clear whether the clause only allows an investor to invoke provisions from
other investment treaties that are "compatible in principle," and if so, how
that applies in terms of limiting its application. What is clear, however, is
that cases decided so far have generally allowed a contracting party to
"import" substantive provisions from other BITs entered into by the other
contracting party. In Bayindir v. Pakistan,86 for instance, the tribunal held
that the MFN provision allowed the investor to invoke a fair and equitable
treatment clause from another BIT. Similarly, in CME v. Czech
Republic," the tribunal argued that the investor could rely on an
expropriation provision from another BIT to determine the standard of
compensation. Arguably, this implies that even if a South-South BIT does
not include an NT provision, for instance, the MFN clause may oblige the
parties to extend NT nevertheless as long as they have included NT in at
least one other BIT.
It is therefore notable that all BITs in the sample include an MFN
provision, and none of them exempts NT or transfer clauses from the
83 Marie-France Houde & Fabrizio Pagani, OECD, Most-favoured-nation Treatment in
International Investment Law (OECD Working Paper on International Investment, No.
2004/2, 2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/37/33773085.pdf; see DOLZER
& SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 186.
84 See, e.g., Maffezini v. Spain (Arg. v. Spain), ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/97/7
(Jan. 25, 2000), 16 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INV. L.J. 212 (2001), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Maffezini-Jurisdiction-EnglishOOO.pdf; Berschader v.
Russian Federation, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce [SCC]
Case No. 080/2004 (Apr. 21, 2006); see generally Locknie Hsu, MFN and Dispute
Settlement-When the Twain Meet, 7 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 25 (2006).
85 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 191.
86 Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.$. v. Pakistan (Turk. v. Pak.), ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/03/29 (Nov. 14, 2005).
8 Id. para. 231; see also MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Chile (Malay. v. Chile), ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/01/7, Award, paras. 103-04 (May 25, 2004).
8 CME Czech Rep. B.V. v. Czech Republic (Neth. v. Czech Rep.), U.N. Comm'n on
Int'l Trade Law, Final Award (Mar. 14, 2003), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003-Final_002.pdf.
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clause's coverage. Since very few countries have consistently limited NT
or transfer clauses in all their BITs, this means that as a general rule,
differences in substantive rules between South-South and North-South BITs
are "levelled out" by the treaties' MFN provisions. As a result, the more
restricted standards in South-South BITs will rarely become relevant for
investors in practice, who can continue to rely on BITs with more favorable
provisions. This, of course, leaves us with a considerable puzzle: why have
developing countries often allowed more flexibility to host states in BITs
signed with each other but then failed to make sure that this "policy-space"
is not cancelled out by the treaties' MFN clauses? If the more limited
substantive provisions in South-South BITs have little, if any, relevance for
the legal rights granted to foreign investors in practice, why limit them in
the first place?
At a first glance, one possible explanation could be that the exceptions
are intended as signals of a distinct South-South BIT agenda more in tune
with the one developing countries have expressed in multilateral investment
negotiations as a group. If so, the negotiating parties may not have been too
concerned with whether the limitations actually have implications for
foreign investors in practice. The contracting parties may have tried to
appear as though they sign "development friendly" BITs, while at the same
time appeasing investors that they are granted normal BIT-protections.
However, such clever intentions are unlikely to have driven the pattern. It
is important to note that the overwhelming majority of BITs have been
signed largely under the radars of public opinion. Except for BITs with the
United States, the vast majority of BIT negotiations seem to have caught
(surprisingly) limited attention, o and it is therefore difficult to see how the
aspects of South-South BITs investigated here could be intended as
symbolic political statements.
So perhaps a more plausible explanation could be that developing
countries have simply failed to realize the full implications of MFN-
provisions. Indeed, there are indications that developing countries have
often failed to understand the true nature and scope of BITs when signing
up to them.9' It suffices to say that this suggestion may appear paternalistic
90 See, e.g., Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Reflections on Pakistan's
Investment-Treaty Program after 50 Years: An Interview with the Former Attorney General
of Pakistan, Makhdoom Ali Khan, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Mar. 16, 2009,
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/03/16/pakistans-standstill-in-
investment-treaty-making-an-interview-with-the-former-attomey-general-of-pakistan-
makhdoom-ali-khan.aspx; Luke Peterson, Out of Order, FDI MAGAZINE, Oct. 7, 2008,
available at http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/2575/Out oforder.html;
see, e.g., Dep't of Trade & Indus., Republic of South Africa, Government Position Paper on
Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review (June 2009), available at
http://www.pmg.org.za/files/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf.
9' Id.; DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 16, at 8.
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to some.92 But when asked about why the MFN provision had not been
adjusted to accommodate the different standards in the country's BIT-
network, one former BIT-negotiator responded: "We didn't have a
consistent approach because there wasn't an understanding that consistency
was required . . .. No one seemed to realize the implications of the MFN
provision." 9 3 Other BIT-negotiators have similarly mentioned in interviews
that their predecessors did not know how MFN provisions worked as they
often had no background or training in international law.9 4 One recalled
that the speed with which many South-South BITs were signed exacerbated
this capacity problem: "For instance, in all these mini-conferences
UNCTAD would actively promote BITs to be signed amongst the
participants-often within as little as a few hours-and I couldn't see that
any serious considerations were given by the countries whatsoever. "5 And
while officials from developing countries might have a better understanding
today of the effect of different BIT-provisions compared to ten years ago, it
is probably still incomplete in many cases. One negotiator suggests:
While workshops held by various international organizations might
help somewhat in upgrading developing countries' negotiating
capacity, they haven't solved the problem. There is still not a very
good understanding of what is implied by the different provisions, so
even if negotiators from the developing world take their b
seriously, they are often not entirely aware of what they are doing.
Accordingly, even if developing countries have aimed to restrict
certain provisions in their South-South BITs, these statements suggest that
they might not have had the proper legal expertise to make sure such
restrictions are enforceable in practice. If this is in fact the case, that would
naturally raise a more general question pertaining to the level of
understanding within developing countries when entering into BITs and, as
such, the level of rationality we as observers should assume about the BIT-
making process. While I am currently undertaking such a research project,
these explanations remain provisional for now and must therefore be
subject to further investigation.
92 See Francisco Orrego Vicufia, Regulatory Expropriations in International Law: Carlos
Calvo, Honorary NAFTA Citizen, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 19, 31 (2002).
9 Telephone interview with developing country BIT-negotiator (May 2009) (not for
attribution, on file with author).
94 Telephone interviews with developing country BIT-negotiator (February and August
2009) (not for attribution, on file with author).
9 Telephone interview with developing country BIT-negotiator (August 2009) (not for
attribution, on file with author).
96 Telephone interview with developing country BIT-negotiator (January 2009) (not for
attribution, on file with author).
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VI. CONCLUSION
This article analyzed two substantive BIT-provisions across a large
sample of treaties from the mid-1990s to 2006. It showed that treaties
signed by two developing countries have varied systematically from more
typical North-South BITs. In South-South BITs, NT provisions have
tended to be more restricted (or completely absent), and transfer clauses
more likely to allow restrictions to foreign investors' repatriation of funds.
In contrast to the vast majority of other studies investigating the content of
BITs, I used regression techniques to control for possible omitted variable
biases and demonstrated that the systematic pattern persisted even after
adjusting for a number of important covariates.
The last section of the article noted, however, that none of the South-
South BITs made sure that such restrictions were not potentially "levelled
out" by the treaties' MFN provisions, and concluded by speculating
whether this de facto coherence in developing countries' BIT-networks
might have been unintended. If true, this would be problematic. As stated
by UNCTAD, "[i]f countries are unable to properly understand and assess
the content of the agreements to which they have agreed because of their
complexity, the risk arises that they will enter into agreements that they are
unprepared to honour fully."9 7
Ultimately, however, the intent of developing countries when entering
into South-South BITs is left open for further research. Arguably, this
would require the application of qualitative methodologies, as the
objectives of developing countries can only truly be inferred by
investigating the ideas and thoughts of key actors involved in the politics
and negotiations of investment treaty rule-making. Unfortunately, not
much research has been conducted so far. To understand the sometimes
paradoxical behaviour of developing countries in the international
investment regime, future research should therefore triangulate quantitative
studies investigating systematic patterns in rule-making (like this article)
with qualitative studies investigating the actual intent of the contracting
parties. This might also allow a further clarification of differences among
developing countries, such as whether those with large outward FDI flows
have systematically different strategies and intentions than developing
countries with only few investments abroad. This and related questions
would require not treating developing countries as a monolith with one
fixed set of interests, as done in so many studies including, to some extent,
this one.
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